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Abstract 
Congress routinely enacts statutes mandating that federal agencies adopt specific regulations. For 
example, when Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 
2010, it required the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt a regulation compelling 
energy companies to disclose payments they make to governmental entities. Although this disclosure 
regulation is specifically required by the Dodd-Frank Act, it is also a regulation subject to disapproval by 
Congress under a process outlined in a separate statute known as the Congressional Review Act (CRA).  
In 2017, Congress passed a joint resolution disapproving the SEC’s disclosure rule under the 
process authorized in the CRA. That resolution nullified the SEC’s rule, but it did not amend the 
Dodd-Frank Act. It did, though, make relevant a provision in the CRA that prohibits an agency from 
adopting any regulation that is “substantially the same” as one that Congress has disapproved. As a 
result, the SEC still must issue a disclosure regulation, but it cannot issue one that is substantially the 
same as the old one. Although normally this might not pose a major problem to an agency, the Dodd-
Frank Act not only requires a disclosure regulation, it also provides considerable detail about what 
must be included in that regulation. 
The SEC faces what appears to be a conundrum. On the one hand, it must adopt a regulation 
that comports with the detailed provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. But on the other hand, it is 
prohibited under the CRA from adopting a regulation that is “substantially the same” as the old 
regulation. What is the agency to do? Earlier this year, the SEC announced a proposal for a new 
disclosure regulation that differs in several ways from the old one—but the proposed regulation 
would also appear in some respects to violate the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirements for how the 
disclosure rule should be designed.  
In this paper— originally submitted as a public comment on the SEC’s proposed rule—I 
explain that the SEC need not violate the Dodd-Frank Act to comply with the CRA. The CRA 
conundrum can be readily solved. The CRA’s choice of the imprecise word “substantially” invites 
the SEC to reconcile both statutes. The agency can do so by ensuring that those features of a new 
regulation that remain in the SEC’s discretion are not substantially the same as in the old rule. After 
all, a statute such as the CRA can only impose an obligation on an agency over matters over which 
it has a choice. The SEC just needs to make sure that any re-issued rule is no longer substantially 
the same in terms of portions of the rule over which the agency can exercise its discretion. 
Even with detailed statutory provisions, such as the one in the Dodd-Frank Act, an agency 
nevertheless will still have some discretion available to it. It can exercise that discretion in a 
substantially different way even if by making available opportunities for waivers or by extending 
deadlines for compliance. The disapproval of a rule under the CRA simply does not relieve an 








Edward B. Shils Professor of Law 
Director, Penn Program on Regulation 




I am submitting this comment on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
proposed new Rule 13q-11 which has followed from the 2017 disapproval of an earlier version of 
Rule 13q-1 under the Congressional Review Act (CRA).2 This comment takes no substantive 
position on the proposed Rule 13q-1. I write on my own behalf, as a scholar who has taught and 
written on statutory interpretation and administrative law issues for over twenty-five years, 
seeking to offer the Commission the benefit of my analysis of the legal issues created by an 
apparent tension between the CRA and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act. Specifically, I address the proper construction of the CRA’s prohibition on an 
agency adopting a rule that is “substantially the same” as a disapproved rule when a substantive 
statute—in this instance, the Dodd-Frank Act—has clearly mandated that an agency adopt a rule 
along the lines of the disapproved rule.  
In other words, the question addressed here is: How should an agency resolve the apparent 
contradiction created by (a) the CRA’s “substantially the same” prohibition and (b) a substantive 
statute’s mandate for a rule that takes a particular form? The answer, in brief, is that any 
assessment of whether a subsequent rule is “substantially the same” as an earlier disapproved 
rule must be made with reference to the discretion the substantive statute affords the agency in 
designing the rule. A congressional disapproval resolution under the CRA does not amend the 
substantive statute to eliminate its requirement that the agency adopt a rule that meets certain 
criteria or contains specified elements. What counts as a substantial similarity or difference thus 
cannot be made simply by comparing the two rules on their face, completely divorced from the 
substantive statute’s mandate. When Congress has required an agency to adopt a rule that 
Congress later disapproves, the approach that best respects both the statutory prohibition in the 
CRA and statutory requirement in the substantive law is to look to see whether the agency has 
exercised its discretion in substantially the same manner. 
 
* This paper was submitted on March 16, 2020, as a comment to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission on its proposed rule on disclosure of payments by resource extraction issuers, 85 Fed. Reg. 
2522-2571 (Jan. 15, 2020), File Number S7–24–19. Copyright © 2020 by Cary Coglianese. All rights 
reserved. 
1 85 Fed. Reg. 2522 (Jan. 15, 2020). 
2 5 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. 
 2 
The Dodd-Frank Act, Rule 13q-1, and the CRA 
In 2010, Congress enacted Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act,3 instructing the SEC to adopt an administrative rule requiring detailed 
reporting of payments made by natural resource extraction issuers to governmental entities, as a 
way of addressing concerns about corruption in countries that are rich in natural resources, such 
as oil. 
Section 1504 is detailed and specific. In its approximately 800 words, this section directs 
the SEC, among other things, to issue its disclosure rule on resource extraction within nine 
months after the Dodd-Frank Act’s enactment. The section also provides statutory definitions for 
integral terms, such as “payments” and “resource extraction issuers.”  
In response to the statutory mandate in Section 1504, the SEC initially adopted a final 
rule4 which was subsequently vacated in 2013 by the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia as arbitrary and capricious.5 On remand from the court, the SEC issued a new rule in 
20166 which was then disapproved by a 2017 joint resolution passed by Congress and signed by 
the President7 in accordance with the procedures outlined in the CRA.8  
Under the CRA, a rule that is disapproved no longer has any legal force or effect.9 
Furthermore, under the CRA, the agency that adopted the disapproved rule is precluded from 
issuing the same rule in the future.10 The relevant provision of the CRA—Section 801(b)(2)—
reads as follows: 
A rule [disapproved under the CRA] may not be reissued in substantially the 
same form, and a new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule may 
not be issued, unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a 
 
3 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q). 
4 77 Fed. Reg. 56365 (Sept. 12, 2012).  
5 Amer. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. July 2, 2013). 
6 81 Fed. Reg. 49359 (Jul. 27, 2016). 
7 Pub. L. No. 115-4 (2017), https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ4/PLAW-115publ4.pdf. 
8 5 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. 
9 The entirety of the joint resolution of disapproval of the SEC resource extraction payment disclosure 
rule reads as follows: “Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission relating to ‘‘Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers’’ (published 
at 81 Fed. Reg. 49359 (July 27, 2016)), and such rule shall have no force or effect.” This language 
follows the required template for such a disapproval resolution in the CRA, 5 U.S.C. § 802(a).  
10 Unlike with the nullification of the SEC’s 2016 rule, this preclusion stems from the CRA, not any 
language within the 2017 joint resolution of disapproval. Except for the most general heading that 
references “chapter 8 of title 5” of the U.S. Code, a heading that is not itself part of the enacted law, the 
joint resolution contains no language whatsoever about any limitations on the SEC’s ability to adopt a 
subsequent administrative rule on the disclosure of payments by resource extraction issuers. 
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law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original 
rule.11 
As the Commission notes in the preamble to its proposed rule, the CRA does not explicitly 
define what is meant by “substantially the same.”12 Moreover, no court has yet been presented 
with the occasion to construe these words in the CRA.13  
Discerning the meaning of “substantially the same” is pivotal in the context of the SEC’s 
recently proposed new Rule 13q-1. As the Commission correctly acknowledges, the agency 
remains under a statutory obligation to adopt a rule that implements Section 1504 and its detailed 
provisions.14 But with its recently proposed rule, the Commission also appears to be proposing or 
considering modifications of its 2016 rule that may be inconsistent with the Dodd-Frank Act, 
even though it is clear that neither the CRA nor the 2017 joint resolution of disapproval 
effectuated any amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act.15 
“Substantially the Same” and the CRA Conundrum 
In the abstract, the CRA’s “substantially the same” provision might seem unremarkable. 
For purposes of illustration, consider a hypothetical agency that issues a hypothetical rule that 
consists of, say, 100 words. If that rule were disapproved under the CRA and the agency 
subsequently issued a new rule that contained the same 100 words in identical order, the new 
rule would not only be substantially the same—it would be exactly the same. But what if the new 
rule eliminated one word? It would seem rather obviously to be “substantially the same” as the 
original 100-word rule that had been disapproved.  
Yet exactly how many words would need to be eliminated or changed before the new rule 
would no longer be “substantially the same” as the rule that had been disapproved? 10? 20? 60? 
70? The CRA provides no bright line. The statute leaves other questions unanswered too. Even if 
an agency changed all 100 words but the new rule retained the same meaning—that is, it still 
obligated the same individuals or entities to undertake or avoid the same actions—would this be 
 
11 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2). 
12 85 Fed. Reg. at 2526 (“The CRA does not define the phrase ‘substantially the same’”…). 
13 It may not be immediately clear whether a court could ever be confronted with this question, as a 
precedent question is whether any suit for noncompliance with the CRA would be barred by Section 805 
of the CRA, which states that “[n]o determination, finding, action, or omission under this chapter shall be 
subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 805. Presumably, this limitation on judicial review would not bar a 
court from enforcing the CRA’s prohibition on the issuance of a subsequent rule that was “substantially 
the same” because judicial review in such a case would be of an action based on the substantive statute, 
not one arising “under” the CRA.  
14 The Commission states: “Although the joint resolution vacated the 2016 Rules, the statutory mandate 
under Section 13(q) of the Exchange Act remains in effect. As a result, the Commission is statutorily 
obligated to issue a new rule.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 2526. 
15 Among other issues, for example, it seems arguable whether the Commission’s proposed approach to 
the aggregation of payments in submissions would be consistent with the Dodd-Frank Act, which calls for 
disclosure of “any payment,” not an aggregated amount of payments. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A). 
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“substantially the same”? What if the new rule imposed different obligations on different 
individuals or entities but still achieved the same overall benefits and imposed the same overall 
costs?  
The text of the CRA does not provide ready answers to these questions. It most 
emphatically does not speak at all to what might be called the “CRA’s conundrum”—a puzzle 
that arises when an agency faces another, substantive statute that requires it to adopt a rule, as 
often is the case. The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, contained explicit provisions requiring 
agencies to adopt nearly 250 specific rules.16 The CRA conundrum arises because of the 
possibility of a conflict between a substantive statute, such as the Dodd-Frank Act, and the CRA. 
When an agency is obligated to create a particular rule by another statute, and yet Congress 
disapproves such a rule under the CRA, what is the agency now obligated and allowed to do?17 
Solving the CRA’s Conundrum 
The imprecision of the CRA’s text—through its use of the word “substantially”—implies 
that the CRA is not intended to impose a rigid restriction on an agency. It is also clear that a 
CRA disapproval resolution does not lift an agency obligation to comply with another legal 
requirement that calls for a rule similar to the one disapproved. 
Indeed, the drafters of the CRA expressly contemplated that other statutes impose 
rulemaking requirements on agencies. The text of the CRA makes clear that a resolution of 
disapproval does not repeal those requirements. Section 803 of the Act provides a “special rule” 
on statutory deadlines, expressly extending by a year after enactment of a joint resolution of 
disapproval any deadline in a substantive statute that imposes an obligation to issue a rule by a 
date certain.18 Section 803 would not have been needed if a resolution of disapproval were to be 
construed as a repeal of a substantive statute’s requirement to promulgate a rule. 
 
16 Davis Polk, Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 
2010), https://www.davispolk.com/files/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-b7c025ed2ecf/Presen 
tation/PublicationAttachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77-f786fb90464a/070910_Financial_Reform 
_Summary.pdf (“By our count, the Act requires 243 rulemakings…”). 
17 An agency might, of course, permissibly modify an earlier construction of ambiguous aspects of the 
substantive statute. A new agency interpretation of any such ambiguous provisions in the substantive 
statute might well prove reasonable and entitled to deference, even when its earlier interpretation was also 
reasonable and entitled to deference. Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984) (“An initial agency 
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.”). By revising its interpretation of such ambiguous 
provisions, the agency may be able to make its post-disapproval rule substantially different than its pre-
disapproval rule. This would be another way of giving effect to both statutes, but this possibility amounts 
to a retreat from the assumption underlying the analysis in this comment: namely, that the CRA and the 
substantive statute are truly in tension. To the extent that the substantive statute can be reinterpreted to 
eliminate that tension and allow the agency room to make what would colloquially be deemed a 
substantially different rule, then there really would be no CRA conundrum presented. 
18 5 U.S.C. § 803. 
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Of course, it is also a longstanding, firmly entrenched principle of statutory interpretation 
that repeals of statutes should be stated expressly—and nothing express to this effect can be 
found in a CRA resolution of disapproval. As early as 1814, the Supreme Court has made it clear 
that repeals by implication are disfavored.19 The Court has described the general presumption 
against implied repeals as a “cardinal rule,” stating that “[w]here there are two acts upon the 
same subject, effect should be given to both if possible.”20 It has explained that, “[i]n the absence 
of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a 
repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.”21  
But if we assume an irreconcilable difference between the CRA and the Dodd-Frank Act, 
this would hardly imply that the CRA had repealed Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Quite 
the contrary, if Section 1504 and the CRA Section 801(b)(2) were hopelessly irreconcilable, 
Section 1504 would impliedly repeal the application of Section 801(b)(2) with respect to rules 
issued under Section 1504. This conclusion follows directly from two other longstanding, well-
accepted principles of statutory construction: namely, (1) that specific statutes (such as the Dodd-
Frank Act) take priority over general statutes (such as the CRA), and (2) that later statutes 
prevail over earlier ones. The Dodd-Frank Act was enacted in 2010, while the CRA was adopted 
in 1996—meaning that, if the provisions are assumed irreconcilable, then the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
provisions prevail. (Admittedly, the resolution of disapproval comes last of all, after the 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. But the disapproval resolution does not contain any 
prohibition on the adoption of a substantially similar rule; only the 1996 CRA does.22 If an 
irreconcilable conflict were to arise, it would be because of Section 801(b)(2) in the CRA, not 
any provision in the disapproval resolution.)  
All this said, there in fact exists no reason to assume an irreconcilable conflict between 
the Dodd-Frank Act and the CRA. This is because “substantially the same” is flexible and can 
and should be construed in a way that gives effect to both the CRA and the Dodd-Frank Act. The 
way to reconcile the two statutes is to recognize that what constitutes substantial similarity under 
the CRA depends on the degree of discretion afforded to the agency under the substantive statute 
(such as the Dodd-Frank Act). To see how this is so, let us return to the hypothetical example of 
a 100-word rule that has been disapproved by Congress under the CRA. Let us further assume, 
simply for the sake of analysis, that 70 of those words had been expressly dictated by a 
substantive statute obligating an agency to issue the rule. How should a new rule be judged if it 
contains those same 70 words but makes meaningful changes to the 30 words that were not 
required by the substantive statute? Taking the overall 100 words into account, perhaps it might 
 
19 Hartford v. United States, 12 U.S. 109, 109 (1814) (“[A] repeal by implication ought not to be 
presumed unless from the repugnance of the provisions the inference be necessary and unavoidable.”). 
20 Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). 
21 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (“In the absence of some affirmative showing of an 
intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and 
later statutes are irreconcilable.”). See, e.g., Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (plurality 
opinion). (“We have repeatedly stated . . . that absent a clearly expressed congressional intention, repeals 
by implication are not favored” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
22 See supra note 9. 
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seem as if the new rule is still substantially similar to the old rule, as 70 percent of the words are 
the same. But that cannot be the correct result, as it would imply that the CRA has repealed the 
substantive statute that requires those 70 words—a result which, as I explained above, cannot be 
the correct conclusion under well-accepted statutory interpretation principles. The better 
conclusion is that the agency, having genuinely changed its approach in the portion of the rule 
over which it had discretion, has acted faithfully both to Section 801(b)(2) of the CRA and to the 
commands of its underlying substantive statute. In fact, this is not only the better conclusion 
about how to construe “substantially the same,” it is the only possible way to understand it in the 
context of constraining substantive commands imposed by other statutes on the agency. 
Given the specificity and detail in Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC finds 
itself in a position not at all unlike the hypothetical statute that compels 70 percent of the words 
in a rulemaking. I make no claim to quantify the level of discretion left to the SEC in developing 
its Rule 13q-1, but it is clear that the Commission has much less discretion over its resource 
extraction payments rule than a rule adopted under a more general authorization to create rules as 
“may be necessary or appropriate,”23 as statutory authorizations of rulemaking not infrequently 
provide.24 Every rule, though, will have multiple issues that need to be addressed, or different 
dimensions to be covered—the who, what, when, and how of rulemaking.25 In some cases, as 
with Section 1504, the substantive statute will dictate how some of these issues or dimensions 
are to be addressed. (And in the case of Rule 13q-1 in particular, some of these issues or 
dimensions may also have been effectively foreclosed by the district court’s decision applying 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious test to an earlier version of the rule.)  
When it comes to compliance with the CRA’s provision on substantial similarity, the 
reconciling approach is to consider fixed, and unaffected by a disapproval resolution, those parts 
of the rule that Congress has effectively written for the agency by requiring that the agency 
include in its rule certain features, definitions, or provisions. The task is simply to see how 
similar the rule is in those aspects over which the agency has discretion. The basic idea, in other 
words, is to think spatially about agency discretion. Consider how much of the regulatory 
“space” the substantive statute allowed the agency to fill, and then make sure that any new rule 
that follows a disapproved rule is not substantially the same within that remaining space that the 
substantive statute gave the agency power to fill. 
 
 
23 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j). 
24 For additional examples, see Cary Coglianese, Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
1339, 1350-1351 (2017). 
25 The Commission’s preamble to its proposed rule seems to recognize as much, when it refers to the “the 
amount, granularity, timing, scope of, and liability for, the required disclosures. 85 Fed. Reg. at 2527. For 
related but general discussions, see Cary Coglianese, Regulation’s Four Components, Reg. Rev. (Sept. 
17, 2012), https://www.theregreview.org/2012/09/17/regulations-four-core-components/; Cary 
Coglianese, Dimensions of Delegation, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1849, 1863-1870 (2019). 
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On the Applicability of Chevron and Legislative History  
 This spatial understanding is a reasonable way to accommodate both the CRA and the 
Dodd-Frank Act. That reasonableness might lead some observers to think that the SEC should 
receive deference under Chevron v. NRDC 26 if the agency were to adopt this approach—
especially considering that the word “substantially” is ambiguous, for reasons discussed above. 
But a court would not be justified in giving the SEC Chevron deference if it adopted this 
approach. Chevron deference is grounded on an implied delegation to an agency27—and, while 
Congress has authorized the SEC to implement aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act, it has not 
delegated to the SEC or any other agency the authority to construe ambiguous terms in the CRA. 
Chevron deference is not available to agencies for their interpretations of general statutes, no 
matter how reasonable those interpretations may be.28 
 The issue of Chevron deference is thus largely a distraction, as the spatial understanding 
of “substantially the same” in the CRA is not merely a reasonable interpretation of the CRA in a 
setting where a statute has compelled an agency to adopt a specific rule; it is also the only 
plausible interpretation that reconciles both the CRA and the substantive statute. A court would 
need to adopt this as it is the only way to fulfill the principle that “effect should be given to both 
[statutes] if possible.”29 
Still, it is worth mentioning Chevron for another reason: to make clear that such 
deference cannot sustain an agency position to construe the CRA’s “substantially the same” 
provision in a manner that effectively amends a substantive statute, such as by claiming that the 
resolution of disapproval now releases the agency from its responsibility to comply with the 
substantive statute. An agency would hardly be entitled to deference for such a claim that a 
resolution of disapproval under the CRA amended or repealed a substantive statute. The text of 
such a resolution of disapproval, after all, is stipulated by the CRA itself to read quite sparsely as 
follows: 
“That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the ___ relating to ___, and 
such rule shall have no force or effect.” (The blank spaces being appropriately 
filled in).30 
 
26 467 U.S. 837. 
27 See Coglianese, supra note 24, at 1347-1350. 
28 Arianna Skibell & Geof Koss, SEC Rule Repeal Sets Stage for Unprecedented Legal Fight, E&E Daily 
(Feb. 10, 2017) (attributing to the author of this comment the conclusion that the SEC cannot win 
Chevron deference for an interpretation of a general statute such as the CRA); Michael J. Cole, 
Interpreting the Congressional Review Act: Why the Courts Should Assert Judicial Review, Narrowly 
Construe “Substantially The Same,” and Decline to Defer to Agencies Under Chevron, 70 Admin. L. 
Rev. 53, 94-101 (2018) (arguing much the same). 
29 Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503. 
30 5 U.S.C. § 802(a).   
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Nothing in a resolution worded like this—as a resolution is supposed to be worded under the 
CRA—appears in any relevant way to be ambiguous. Nor is it possible to see how any 
interpretation of this text could ever sustain a reasonable interpretation that yet another statute 
had been effectively amended or repealed by such a resolution. 
In addition, it would be extremely problematic for an agency to rely on any legislative 
history standing behind such a resolution of disapproval to imply an amendment or repeal of 
another statute. Legislative history can be an aid in understanding a statute and giving it 
meaning, but it is not the law adopted by Congress. None of the words contained in a joint 
resolution of disapproval signed by the president speak in any way to amending or repealing any 
statute. Legislative history needs to be at least connected to and in service of the meaning of a 
statute. When the relevant statute is a CRA resolution of disapproval, any such history that may 
pertain to how any entirely separate statute ought to be construed would be devoid of any 
connection with the disapproval resolution. All the resolution does is remove the force and effect 
of the rule; it does not speak to the statute underlying the disapproved rule. 
In the preamble to its recent proposed rule, the SEC looks to the legislative history of the 
joint resolution of disapproval for guidance as to what its options may be for a subsequent 
rulemaking. Some of the Commission’s invocation of legislative history is innocuous.  For 
example, the Commission quite appropriately acknowledges that even some members of 
Congress who voted for the disapproval resolution did so while recognizing that the agency still 
must go back and follow the dictates of the Dodd-Frank Act in issuing a new rule.31 
More concerningly, the Commission elsewhere in its preamble cites a problematic 
passage in the legislative history of the CRA itself, quoting part of a flawed claim made by 
Senate sponsors of the bill that became the CRA.32 Their claim suggested that the legislative 
history of a resolution of disapproval could be used to support an agency taking a position on a 
new rule that would effectively modify or even repeal the relevant substantive statute: 
The authors intend the debate on any resolution of disapproval to focus on the law 
that authorized the rule and make the congressional intent clear regarding the 
agency’s options or lack thereof after enactment of a joint resolution of 
disapproval. It will be the agency’s responsibility in the first instance when 
promulgating the rule to determine the range of discretion afforded under the 
 
31 85 Fed. Reg. at 2526, n. 60 (“A number of members who supported the joint resolution noted that the 
Commission would be obligated to issue a new rule fulfilling the statutory mandate.”). 
32 The legislative history consists mainly of a joint statement of Senate sponsors introduced in the Senate 
only after the House had already passed the bill and only “immediately” before passage in the Senate 
under a motion for unanimous consent. 142 Cong. Rec. S3683 (April 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Nickles). Only later, after the President signed the CRA, did relevant committee chairs in the House 
submit into the record the statement of the Senate sponsors. Id. 
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original law and whether the law authorizes the agency to issue a substantially 
different rule. Then, the agency must give effect to the resolution of disapproval.33 
The full passage from which this quotation has been taken also states that “if an agency is 
mandated to promulgate a particular rule and its discretion in issuing the rule is narrowly 
circumscribed, the enactment of a resolution of disapproval for that rule may work to prohibit the 
reissuance of any rule.”34 The Commission is to be applauded for not quoting or endorsing this 
additional sentence in its preamble as it does not reflect a proper reading of the authority of 
either members of Congress or an administrative agency. 
As already indicated, regardless of what might have transpired in the legislative 
deliberations leading up to a resolution of disapproval, nothing in such a resolution would make 
any of the legislators’ views about the continued wisdom of a prior, duly enacted law germane to 
an understanding of the actual resolution adopted. Contrary to what the Senate sponsors of the 
CRA claimed in their joint statement, Congress cannot through statements in the legislative 
history of a CRA disapproval resolution bypass the normal bicameral and presentment 
requirements to amend a statute that requires an agency to promulgate a specific rule.35 If 
Congress wants to repeal or change the parameters of a substantive statute’s obligation on an 
agency, it cannot do so via legislative history to a process directed at administrative rules.  
Conclusion 
Until Congress repeals or amends a substantive statute imposing specific rulemaking 
requirements on an agency, the agency is bound to respect its statutory requirements. A court can 
be expected to hold the agency to those obligations. In the case of an agency such as the SEC, 
which faces both a substantive statute’s obligations and a resolution of disapproval of an earlier 
version of a rule established to fulfill the agency’s substantive obligations, the resolution of 
disapproval does not, as the SEC recognizes, alleviate the agency’s underlying substantive 
statutory obligations. When a statute mandates a rule such as Rule 13q-1, the question is not 
whether to assess “substantially the same” in the abstract. Rather, those terms in the CRA must 
be understood by reference to the degree of agency discretion that is afforded in the original 
statute.  
Agencies cannot use the CRA to expand their discretion by revising aspects of a previous 
rule that were required to fulfill the agency’s obligations under a substantive statute. The SEC 
could not weaken a disclosure regime in contravention of requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act, 
for example, even if in the name of satisfying the CRA. In circumstances where a substantive 
statute spells out in exacting detail what a rule must entail, an agency may still have some degree 
of discretion, if only to offer the possibility of waivers or perhaps to phase in or otherwise delay 
the date for compliance with its new rule. In such situations where agencies have been given no 
 
33 85 Fed. Reg. at 2526, n. 63. 
34 142 Cong. Rec. S3686 (April 18, 1996). 
35 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 10 
other discretion under a substantive statute as to the form and content of a rule, the inclusion of a 
limited exemption or waiver option, or a delayed compliance date, could suffice to satisfy the 
CRA by making the subsequent rule substantially different in the relevant space of available 
agency discretion.36 A spatial understanding of what it means to be substantially the same holds 
the key to reconciling the apparent conundrum created when a procedural statute, such as the 
CRA, comes into tension with the requirements of a later-enacted substantive statute, such as the 
Dodd-Frank Act. Only under such an approach can an agency give due effect to both statutes.  
 
36 Skibell & Koss, supra note 28 (attributing to the author of this comment the view that “delaying the 
compliance period or providing more opportunities for waivers” could suffice to make a new rule 
substantially different from an old one). 
